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Abstract
The optimal crop revenue insurance contract is designed from recent developments in the
theory of insurance economics under incomplete markets. The message is twofold. Firstly,
when the indemnity schedule is contingent on individual price and individual yield, the
optimal contract depends only on the individual gross revenue. Secondly, this policy is shown
to fail if the indemnity function is based on aggregate price and/or aggregate yield. A closed-
form solution, in which basis risks are ignored, is proposed. It differs from actual revenue
insurance programs proposed to the U.S. farmers. When insurance and capital markets are
unbiased, it can be replicated with existing crop yield and revenue insurance policies and
hedging contracts if the decision variables are not constrained. The impact of yield and price
basis risks on the form of the optimal crop revenue insurance contract is examined and a
closed-form solution is derived.
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Introduction
Crop farmers as well as many other primary commodity producers face joint price and output
(yield) risk. Alternatives for managing the sources of risk have recently expanded with
innovations in revenue insurance which aims at providing a protection against price declines
and/or low yield. The U.S. Risk Management Agency developed a pilot revenue insurance
program known as Income Protection in 1996. Two private sector programs were also
approved: Crop Revenue Coverage and Revenue Assurance. Revenue insurance choices
continue to expand with a new product called Group Risk Income Protection launched in
1999. In Europe, the first revenue insurance contract is proposed to English farmers since
1999 and other policies should be offered to European producers in the near future.
This paper is a first attempt to investigate the design of an optimal crop revenue insurance
contract through recent theoretical developments on optimum insurance in incomplete
markets. When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the individual price and the individual
yield, the optimal indemnity schedule turns out to depend only on the individual gross
revenue, defined as the individual yield times the price at which the producer sells his output.
However, real-world markets often are not complete because the indemnity function is based
on imperfect estimators of the individual yield and/or price. For instance, under Income
Protection and Crop Revenue Coverage programs, indemnity payments are based on national
output price rather than individual price. The optimal revenue insurance is designed in this
context of incomplete markets. Indemnity payments are contingent not only on the aggregate
gross revenue, equal to the aggregate yield multiplied by the aggregate price, but also on the
aggregate price and/or on the aggregate yield. A first closed-form solution of the optimal
revenue insurance contract is proposed when basis risks are ignored. A second one is derived
in the presence of price and yield basis risks when the producer’s preferences exhibit constant3
absolute risk aversion. The latter stresses the role of the producer’s prudent behavior and of
the variability of basis risks on the optimal coverage.
The second purpose of this paper is to examine how the optimal revenue insurance policy
could be replicated with crop and revenue insurance policies and with hedging instruments
offered by real-world insurance and financial markets. The results are used to comment on
empirical findings about the risk-reducing performance of insurance and hedging contracts
recently presented in the agricultural economic literature.
Optimum Insurance Design against Individual Yield and Price Risk
In the expected utility framework, the producer’s preferences are represented by a monotone
increasing and strictly concave  von  Neumann-Morgenstern utility function  u. His gross
revenue is exposed to multiple risks, such as random yield and random price, that affect each
crop. The stochastic gross revenue is defined as a deterministic function  R of n nonnegative
random variables  ( ) n i x x x x x ~ ,..., ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ~
2 1 =  with a joint density function  ( ) n x x f ,..., 1  defined over
the support  [ ] [ ] n x x X , 0 ... , 0 1 · · ” , where  0 > i x  for  n i ,..., 1 = . Hence, the producer’s gross
revenue is  ( ) x R  when  ( ) X x x x n ˛ = ,..., 1  is realized. The function  R is assumed to increase
with respect to each argument:
(1) ( ) ( ) 0 ‡ ¶ ¶ ” i i x x R x R  for all  X x˛ , for  n i ,..., 1 = .
To protect against the occasional occurrence of low revenue levels, the producer has the
opportunity to purchase an insurance contract. It is described by a couple  () [ ] P I , .  where  ( ) x I
is the payment transferred from the insurance company to the insured producer when  x is
realized, and  P is the insurance premium. A central assumption is that the indemnity function
depends upon individual random parameters, such as individual yields and prices at which the
farmer sells his production. A feasible indemnity function must be nonnegative:
(2) ( ) 0 ‡ x I  for all  X x˛4
and the premium is assumed to depend only on the actuarial value of the policy:
(3) ( ) [ ] x EI c P ~ =
with  ( ) 0 0 = c ,  ( ) 1 ‡ ¢ I c  for all  0 ‡ I  and  E is the expectation operator.
An optimal insurance contract is obtained by finding the insurance premium and the
indemnity function that maximize the insured producer’s expected utility function of gross
revenue under the above-mentioned constraints:
(4)      
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ￿ ˛ - + = - +
X x n n n n
P I
dx dx dx x x x f P x x x I x x x R u P x I x R Eu ... ,..., , ,..., , ,..., , ~ ~ max 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
, .
subject to conditions (2) and (3).
Since the unknown function  ( ) x I  depends on  n variables, the extension of the simple Euler
equation can be used to include n dimensions in order to derive the optimal insurance policy.
The objective function and the constraints do not contain the partial derivatives of the optimal
indemnity function. This entails that the Euler equation is a succession of pointwise first-order
conditions for  () . I  and, consequently, problem (4) can be solved by using Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for  ( ) x I  for all  X x˛ . The first-order condition with respect to  ( ) x I  is
(5) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ~ = ¢ - + - + ¢ x EI c x P x I x R u m l
for all  X x˛ , where  m  and  ( ) x l  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated to constraints (3)
and (2), respectively, with







0   if 0 x I
x l
Equation (5) can be rewritten as
(7) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] x EI c P x I x R u ~ ¢ = - + ¢ m  for all  X x˛  such that  ( ) 0 > x I .
In every state of the world in which indemnity payments are made, the marginal utility
function of the insured producer must be constant. Therefore, the optimal indemnity function
depends only on the realized gross revenue, i.e. there exists a function  () . J  such that5
(8) ( ) ( ) [ ] x R J x I =
*  for all  X x˛ .
Since the producer’s utility function is concave and the gross revenue increases with respect
to each argument, an optimal insurance contract has the following form.
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal insurance contract, solution to program (4) subject to
constraints (2) and (3) when P is fixed, provides full coverage below a trigger gross revenue
0 ˆ ‡ R :  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ max
* x R R x I - = .
When the producer faces multiple uncertainty affecting his gross revenue, Proposition 1 states
that it is optimal to purchase a unique insurance contract covering all sources of risks at the
same time, with full insurance below a trigger gross revenue. In other words, the payoff
function 
* I  is the least expensive risk-sharing tool to reach a predetermined insurance
coverage. Such a result holds whatever the degree of correlation between the sources of risk.
The first-order condition of the maximization problem (4) with respect to  P is
(9) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ~ ~ = - - + ¢ m P x I x R u E .
Introducing equation (9) in equation (5) and taking the expectation with respect to  x ~ yields
(10) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) ( ) [ ] P x I x R u E x EI c x E - + ¢ - ¢ = ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ l .
When insurance is sold at an actuarially fair price, i.e.  ( ) 1 = ¢ I c  for all  0 ‡ I ,  ( ) 0 ~ = x El  and
therefore the optimal trigger revenue  R ˆ  is equal to the maximum gross revenue
( ) n x x x R R ,..., , 2 1 = . The insured producer chooses to be fully insured: his gross revenue net of
the indemnity and the insurance premium is equal to its expectation with certainty. When
insurance is costly, i.e.  ( ) 1 > ¢ I c  for some  0 ‡ I ,  ( ) 0 ~ > x El  and consequently  R ˆ  is lower than
R .6
Several results can be derived from Proposition 1, depending on the form of the gross
revenue function  R. They also contribute to re-examining results recently provided by
Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes.
First, let the gross revenue be  ( ) 2 1 2 1
~ ~ ~ , ~ x x x x R =  where  1
~ x  and  2
~ x  are the individual random
price and the individual random yield of a single crop, respectively. Applying Proposition 1
yields that the optimal insurance against joint yield and price risk displays full coverage
whenever the realized individual gross revenue  2 1x x  falls below a trigger level  0 ˆ ‡ R , for a
fixed premium:
(11) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ max , 2 1 2 1
* x x R x x I - = .
This revenue insurance contract is thus the cheapest way of providing a predetermined
coverage level. Consequently, revenue insurance displaying full coverage under  2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ x x R =  is
less costly than price insurance providing full coverage under  1 ˆ x  and crop insurance providing
full coverage under  2 ˆ x  (Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes, Result 1).
Second, consider that the gross revenue satisfies  ( ) 2 1 2 1
~ ~ ~ , ~ x x x x R + =  where  1
~ x  and  2
~ x
represent the random gross revenues of two agricultural activities. From Proposition 1, the
optimal insurance policy in the presence of  1
~ x  and  2
~ x  provides full coverage whenever the
sum of these realized gross revenues  ( ) 2 1 x x +  falls below a trigger level  R ˆ , for a fixed
premium:
(12) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ max , 2 1 2 1
* x x R x x I + - = .
For a given insurance premium, the revenue insurance policy based on the whole-farm
revenue, often called portfolio revenue insurance, provides a better coverage than the sum of
insurance contracts based on commodity-specific revenue, often called commodity-specific
revenue insurance. Consequently, for a predetermined coverage level, the portfolio revenue
insurance is less costly than commodity-specific revenue insurance (Hennessy, Babcock and7
Hayes, Result 2). It should be noticed that this finding is just a reinterpretation of  Raviv’s
result which claims that full insurance above a deductible on the aggregate loss is optimal
when there are multiple additive losses.
The above two cases can be combined to obtain a third one in which the stochastic gross
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Therefore, the portfolio insurance on individual gross revenue below  R ˆ  is less costly than the
sum of price and yield insurance policies (Hennessy, Babcock and Hayes, Result 3).
The superiority of revenue insurance on separate price insurance and yield insurance has
been shown when the indemnity payments are contingent on individual revenue losses.
However, real-world markets often are not complete in that indemnity schedule is based on an
imperfect signal of the producer’s gross revenue. We examine in the next section the design
of an optimal insurance against joint yield and price uncertainty in this context of incomplete
markets.8
Optimum Insurance Design against Aggregate Yield and Price Risk
The indemnity schedule is now assumed to be based on imperfect estimators of individual
yield and price. These indexes can represent aggregate yield estimated in a surrounding
geographic area and futures on board of trade. To model the imperfect mechanism provided
by the insurance markets, individual yield  i y ~  and individual price  i p ~  are written as a linear
function of the yield index  y ~ and price index  p ~, respectively:
(14) 1 1 1
~ ~ ~ e b a + + = p pi
(15)  2 2 2
~ ~ ~ e b a + + = y yi
where  [ ] max , 0 p p˛ ,  [ ] max , 0 y y˛ ,  1
~ e  and  2
~ e  are zero-mean random variables. Such a
relationship is obtained when the stochastic individual yield (price) is projected orthogonally
onto the stochastic yield (price) index.
1 In addition, we assume that  i e ~  is independent of
( ) y p ~ , ~  for  2 , 1 = i , and  1
~ e  is independent of  2
~ e . No specific assumptions need to be made
about the stochastic dependence between the price index and the yield index. An optimal
insurance policy  ( ) [ ] P I , .,.  is solution of the following maximization program:
(16) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] P y p I y p Eu Max
P I
- + + + + + ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
2 2 2 1 1 1
, .,.
e b a e b a
subject to
(17)  ( ) 0 , ‡ y p I  for all ( ) y p,
(18)  ( ) [ ] y p EI c P ~ , ~ =
where the administrative cost function  () . c  is defined as previously. The resolution of this
maximization problem leads to the following proposition.
                                                
1 We thus have  ( ) ( ) p p pi
~ var ~ , ~ cov 1 = b ,  p E p E i
~ ~
1 1 b a - = ,  ( ) ( ) y y yi
~ var ~ , ~ cov 2 = b  and  y E y E i
~ ~
1 2 b a - = .9
PROPOSITION 2. The insurance contract, solution to program (16) subject to constraints
(17) and (18) when  P is fixed, takes one of the following four forms:
(i)  If  0 1 > b  and  0 2 > b , a decreasing trigger function  () . ˆ p  exists such that:
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y p I
(ii)  If  0 1 > b  and  0 2 < b , an increasing trigger function  () . ˆ p  exists such that:











y p p if
y p I
(iii)  If  0 1 < b  and  0 2 > b , an increasing trigger function  () . ˆ p  exists such that:
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(iv)  If  0 1 < b  and  0 2 < b , a decreasing trigger function  () . ˆ p  exists such that:
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y p I
In the four cases, for all ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > y p I y p , the marginal indemnity functions satisfy:
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) p
















(20) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) p
















where  ( )( ) ( ) P y p I y p - + + + + + = , 2 2 2 1 1 1 e b a e b a p  and  i E  is the expectation operator with
respect to  i e ~ , for  2 , 1 = i .
The proof of Proposition 2 is found in the appendix. The form of the optimal crop revenue
insurance contract depends on the sign of the regression coefficients  1 b  and  2 b . If  1 b  is
positive (negative), indemnity payments are made whenever the realized price index is below10
(above) the trigger level. This trigger price is a function of the realized yield index. It
decreases (increases) as the yield index increases if  2 1b b  is positive (negative). The
indemnity function increases (decreases) with the realized price index if  1 b  is positive
(negative) and it increases (decreases) with the realized yield index if  2 b  is positive
(negative).
The impact of actuarially fair insurance, i.e.  ( ) 1 = ¢ I c  for all  0 ‡ I , and costly insurance, i.e.
( ) 1 > ¢ I c  for some  0 ‡ I , on the trigger function is presented in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION  3. Under actuarially fair insurance,  ( ) max ˆ p y p =  for all  y  if  0 1 > b  and
( ) 0 ˆ = y p  for all  y  if  0 1 < b . Under costly insurance,  ( ) max ˆ p y p <  for some  y  if  0 1 > b  and
( ) 0 ˆ > y p  for some  y  if  0 1 < b .
The proof of Proposition 3 is found in the appendix. The producer is thus fully covered
against the revenue variability if the insurance policy is sold at a fair price. He is partially
covered otherwise. The remaining part of this section focuses on the most realistic case where
the regression coefficients  1 b  and  2 b  are positive: the individual price and the price index are
positively correlated, and the individual yield is positively correlated with the yield index. It is
first worthwhile to note that if the insurance indemnity is based on individual price and
individual yield, i.e.  i p p ~ ~ ”  and  i y y ~ ~ ” , then the partial derivatives (19) and (20) are equal to
i y -  and  i p -  for all  ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > i i i i y p I y p , respectively. The optimal insurance contract is
thus  ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max ,
*
i i i i y p R y p I - = , where  0 ˆ ‡ R . This result has been obtained in the previous
section as a consequence of Proposition 1.
If the indemnity schedule is based on yield index and price index, equations (19) and (20)
can be rewritten as:11


































































for all ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > y p I y p , where  j cov  is the covariance operator with respect to the  j e ~  basis
risk, for  2 , 1 = j . The optimal marginal indemnity function with respect to the price index,
expressed in equation (21), is affected by the regression coefficient between the individual
price and the price index, by the bias between the individual yield and the yield index through
the expectation of the individual yield conditional on the yield index, and by the  2
~ e  yield
basis risk through the covariance term. This slope is higher or lower than  [ ] y y y E i = - ~ / ~
1 b
depending on whether the covariance term is positive or negative. Since the profit function
increases with  2
~ e , this covariance is positive, null or negative as the marginal utility function,
is convex, linear or concave in wealth. The notion of prudence, which is linked to the
convexity of  u¢, is recognized as a realistic behavioral assumption (Kimball). It is a necessary
condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion. The role of prudence in the design of an
optimal insurance contract has recently been emphasized by Mahul (2000a) in the presence of
an insurable risk and an uninsurable and independent risk. The marginal indemnity function
with respect to the aggregate price is thus higher than  [ ] y y y E i = - ~ / ~
1 b  if the producer is
prudent. From a similar analysis, the marginal indemnity function with respect to the
aggregate yield in (22) is higher than  [ ] p p p E i = - ~ / ~
2 b  if the producer exhibits prudence.
Mahul (1999) shows that the form of an optimal area yield crop insurance contract under
nonrandom price depends only on the regression coefficient between the individual yield and
the area yield. Consequently, the producer’s preferences does not affect the form of the
contract. When the price is stochastic and the indemnity schedule is contingent on an12
approximation of this price, equation (21) shows that the optimal marginal coverage with
respect to the yield index depends on the producer’s attitude towards risk, and especially his
prudent behavior.
The optimal coverage function characterized by equations (21) and (22) is analyzed in two
steps. Firstly, the covariance terms are ignored in order to focus on the impact of the bias
between individual and aggregate yield and between individual and aggregate price.
Secondly, we assume there is no bias and the effect of yield and price basis risks on the form
of the optimal indemnity schedule is highlighted.
As a first approximation, the covariance terms in (21) and (22) are ignored.
2 The partial
derivatives become
(23) ( ) [ ] y y y E
p
y p I
i = - »
¶




(24)  ( ) [ ] p p p E
y
y p I
i = - »
¶




for all  ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > y p I y p . The closed-form solution of the optimal crop revenue insurance
contract thus takes the following form:
(25) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ~ / ~ ~ / ~ ˆ max , ,
1 * p p p E y y y E S y p I y p I i i
A = = - = » .
The approximate indemnity function is contingent on the product of the conditional
expectation of the individual yield and of the individual price
( ) ( ) ( ) p p p E y y y E y p S i i = = = ~ / ~ ~ / ~ , . Payoffs are made whenever  ( ) y p S ,  is lower than the
trigger level  S ˆ . From equations (14) and (15), this can be rewritten as
(26) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max , 2 1 1 2 2 1
1 py y p T y p I
A b b a b a b + + - =
                                                
2 The covariance term in (21) (in (22)) equals zero if the producer’s utility function is quadratic, an unrealistic
assumption, and/or if the individual price (the individual yield) is a deterministic linear function of the price
index (the yield index), i.e. there is no price basis risk (yield basis risk).13
where  2 1 ˆ ˆ a a - = S T . The approximate indemnity schedule depends not only on the gross
revenue index  py but also on the price index and on the yield index taken separately. It is
worthwhile to note that, contrary to the optimal insurance policy, the closed-form solution
does not depend on the producer’s attitude towards risk. This approximate form can also be
viewed as a consequence of Proposition 1 where the gross revenue is equal to the function  S .
Two particular cases are derived from this result. Firstly, if the insurance indemnity is
based on the price index and on the individual yield, i.e.  i y y ~ ~ ” , then the closed-form solution
(25) becomes
(27) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max 0 , ~ / ~ ˆ max , 1 1
2
i i i i i
A py y S p p p E y S y p I b a + - = = - = .
The approximate indemnity function is contingent on the insurable gross revenue  i py  and on
the individual yield. Secondly, if the insurance indemnity is based on the individual price, i.e.
i p p ~ ~ ” , and on the yield index then the closed-form solution of the optimal insurance contract
can be rewritten as
(28) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max 0 , ~ / ~ ˆ max , 2 2
3 y p p S p y y y E S y p I i i i i i
A b a + - = = - = .
The approximate indemnity schedule is contingent on the insurable gross revenue  y pi  and on
the individual price.
The impact of the price and yield basis risks on the design of an optimal crop revenue
insurance contract is now examined. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that  0 2 1 = =a a
and  1 2 1 = = b b . This entails that  1
~ ~ ~ e + = p pi  and  2
~ ~ ~ e + = y yi , respectively. From equations
(21) and (22), the first derivatives of the optimal coverage become






















































for all  ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > y p I y p , where  ( )( ) ( ) P y p I y p - + + + = ,
*
2 1 e e p . An approximation of the
covariance term in (29) is first provided. Taking a Taylor series expansion of  ( ) p u¢ ¢  around
( ) ( ) P y p I y p - + + = ,
*
2 1 e p  and ignoring the terms associated with the fourth or higher
derivatives of the utility function yield
(31) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 2 1 p e e p p u y u u ¢ ¢ ¢ + + ¢ ¢ » ¢ ¢ .
The expectation of  ( ) p u¢ ¢  with respect to  1
~ e  is approximated by  ( ) ( ) 1 1
~ p p u u E ¢ ¢ » ¢ ¢  because
0 ~
1 1 = e E . From a Taylor series approximation of  ( ) 1 p u¢ ¢  around  ( ) P y p I py E - + = = , ~ *
1 2p p ,
we have
(32) ( ) ( ) ( ) p e p p u p u u ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ » ¢ ¢ 2 1 .
Approximating the expectation of  ( ) 1 p u¢ ¢  with respect to  2
~ e  yields
( ) ( ) ( ) p p p u u E E u E ¢ ¢ » ¢ ¢ » ¢ ¢ ~ ~
2 1 1 2 . From the above approximations, we deduce that
(33) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )








, ~ cov ~
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where  ( ) ( ) ( ) p p p u u R ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ - ”  is the index of absolute prudence. A similar method is used to
approximate the covariance term in (30). Therefore, closed-form solutions of the first
derivatives of the optimal coverage (29) and (30) are




















for all  ( ) ( ) 0 , : ,
* > y p I y p . Contrary to the previous approximation where basis risks were
ignored, the above approximation highlights the impact of the policyholder’s prudent
behavior and of the basis risk variability on the optimal crop revenue insurance design. As
mentioned in the general case, the presence of price and yield basis risks will induce the15
prudent producer to select an indemnity function such that its slope with respect to price
(yield) is higher than  y -  ( p - ). Comparative statics results can be derived from equations
(34) and (35). The more prudent the insured producer, the higher the first derivatives of the
optimal coverage. Suppose that the insured producer’s index of absolute prudence  R is
constant with wealth. This is equivalent to assume that his preferences exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA). Then the derivative of the optimal coverage with respect to
price (yield) increases with the variance of the yield (price) basis risk. Under CARA, the
closed-form solution of the optimal crop revenue insurance is obtained by integrating
equations (34) and (35) with respect to yield and price:











￿ + - - = » 0 , ~ var ~ var
2
1 ˆ max , , 1
2
2
2 * e e y p R py D y p I y p I
B .
Payoffs are thus made whenever  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1
2
2
2 ~ var ~ var
2
1
, e e y p R py y p D + - =  is lower than a
trigger value  0 ˆ ‡ D . The presence of price (yield) basis risk implies that  D is concave in
yield (price).
Optimal Insurance and Hedging Decisions
One of the first insurance product proposed to the U.S. farmers was the multiple peril crop
insurance (MPCI) contract. Under this government-subsidized program, producers receive
indemnities when the realized individual yield falls below a yield guarantee  i y ˆ :
(37) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max i i s i
MPCI y y p y I - =
where  s p  is the nonrandom price selection at which the insurer compensates the farmer for a
unit loss of the commodity. The farmer selects his yield guarantee  i y ˆ  between 50% and 75%
of the individual average historical yield  i m , refereed to as the actual production history16
(APH), in 5% increments, and any price selection between 30% and 100% of the FCIC
estimated market price (GAO, Harwood et al.).
Since 1996, three government-subsidized revenue insurance plans are offered to the U.S.
farmers. For both Income Protection (IP) and Revenue Assurance (RA), the farmer’s gross
revenue guarantee is defined when crops are planted. It equals the product of the yield
guarantee  i y ˆ , which is between 50% and 75% of the farmer’s APH, and the projected price.
The realized gross revenue is established by multiplying the realized yield and a price at
harvest. The producer receives an indemnity when the realized gross revenue falls below the
revenue guarantee:





j py y p y p I d d q - =  for  IP RA j , =
where  p  is the Chicago Board of Trade’s November price for the December contract,  p ˆ  is
the Chicago Board of Trade’s February price for the December contract,  { } 1 , 0 ˛ i q  is the
coverage level chosen by the producer, and 
j d  is a fixed coefficient of adjustment. This
coefficient equals one under IP and a county factor under RA. Therefore, indemnity under IP
is based on individual yield and national price, whereas indemnity under RA is based on
individual yield and local price. Under the third revenue insurance plan, called Crop Revenue
Coverage (CRC), indemnities are triggered if the farmer’s realized gross revenue falls below a
revenue guarantee measured by the product of the realized individual yield and the higher of
the price at planting and the price at harvest:
(39) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ ˆ , max max , i i i i
CRC py y p p y p I - =q .
where the yield guarantee  i y ˆ  is selected between 50% and 85%, in 5% increments, of the
farmer’s APH, and  { } 1 , 95 . 0 , 0 ˛ i q  is the coverage level chosen by the producer. This
indemnity schedule can be rewritten as
(40) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ 0 , ˆ max ˆ max , i i i i
CRC py y p p p y p I - - + =q .17
This revenue insurance thus provides a replacement-cost protection to producer characterized
by the call option  ( ) 0 , ˆ max p p- .
3 The producer’s revenue guarantee may increase over the
season, allowing the producer to purchase “replacement” bushels if yields are low and prices
increase during the season. An innovative insurance product has been proposed to English
producers in 1999. Its indemnity schedule looks like the CRC program, except that it is
contingent on an area yield index rather than the individual yield. Other revenue insurance
contracts are under study and they may be launched in Europe in the near future.
U.S. revenue insurance programs continue to expand, with a new product introduced in
1999 and called Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP). Under this program, coverage is
based on county-level gross revenue, calculated as the product of the county yield and the
harvest-time futures market price. The GRIP program is available as a pilot program in
selected counties for corn and soybean (Dismukes). Formally, its indemnity schedule is
(41) ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ ˆ max , py y p y p I i
GRIP - =q
where  y  is the realized area yield, and  y ˆ  is the area yield guarantee selected between 70%
and 90%, in 5% increments, of the expected area yield, and  i q  is the coverage level. This
insurance policy adds a revenue component to the area yield insurance program.
Farmers have also the opportunity to hedge against yield and price variations on financial
markets. Beside price futures contracts and options on futures to manage price risk, they can
use innovative instruments to hedge against crop yield risk, called Crop Yield Insurance
(CYI) futures and options. They were launched by the Chicago Board of Trade in 1995. The
underlying instruments are the official state-based yield estimates released during the growing
and harvesting season by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Vukina, Li and Holthausen).
                                                
3 The price at harvest is subject to a maximum upward price movement:  m p p + £ ˆ  where m is equal to $1.50
per bushel for corn and $3.00 for soybeans.18
Our purpose is to examine how these revenue insurance contracts can be combined with
the crop insurance policy and the hedging instruments in order to replicate the closed-form
solutions of the optimal hedging strategy against joint yield and price risk. We assume that the
crop and revenue insurance programs do not exhibit constraints on yield and price guarantees
and on the coverage level, and that insurance and hedging instruments are provided at fair
prices. These assumptions will be discussed hereafter.
The yield and price basis risks are first ignored. When the indemnity schedule of the
revenue insurance contract based on individual yield and individual price is available, we
know from Proposition 1 that the first-best optimal insurance policy depends only on the
individual gross revenue and this policy displays full insurance under a critical level.
Consequently, crop insurance and hedging tools turn out to be redundant. Nevertheless, to our
knowledge, such revenue insurance policy is not provided by real-world insurance markets.
When the indemnity schedule of the revenue insurance policy based on individual yield
and aggregate price is available at a fair price, we deduce from Proposition 3 and equation
(27) that the closed-form solution of the optimal indemnity function net of its premium is





A py y y p E y E y p EI y p I y p J 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , , b a b a + - + = - = .
It can be rewritten as
(43) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] i i i i i
A y y E py y p E y p J - + - = ~ ~ ~ , 1 1
2 a b .
The approximate net indemnity function can be replicated by purchasing the IP policy at a
coverage level  1 b q = i , or the RA policy at 
RA
i i d b q = , with a revenue guarantee
max max ˆ ˆ i i y p y p = , where  max p  and  max i y  are the maximum national price and the maximum
individual yield respectively. It thus provides full coverage against the random variable
i y p~ ~
1 b . The farmer also purchases the MPCI contract with  1 a = s p , if positive, and  max ˆ i i y y = .
It provides full coverage against individual yield variations in volume. Therefore the producer
is fully covered against the price risk through the revenue insurance contract. He is partially19
insured against the yield risk and thus he is induced to purchase the MPCI contract, if  1 a  is
positive. Revenue insurance and individual crop insurance turn out to be complementary,
whereas futures contracts and options on futures are redundant. The final wealth of the
insured producer becomes
(44) ( ) ( ) i i i i
A
i i
ins y y p E y E y p J y p w 1 1 1
2 ~ ~ ~ , e b a + + = + = .
The only source of uncertainty borne by the insured producer stems from the zero-mean
random variable  i y ~ ~
1 e . When the indemnity schedule of the revenue insurance contract
depending on the yield index and the price index is available at a fair price, Proposition 3 and
equation (26) yield that the approximate indemnity function net of its premium is
(46) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] py y p y p E y E p E y p EI y p I y p J
A A A
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ , , b b a b a b b b a b a b + + - + + = - =
which can be rewritten as
(44) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] y y E p p E py y p E y p J
A - + - + - = ~ ~ ~ ~ , 1 2 2 1 2 1
1 a b a b b b .
This closed-from solution can be replicated as follows: the producer purchases the GRIP
policy at a coverage level  2 1b b q = i  and at a revenue guarantee  max max ˆ ˆ y p y p = , where  max y  is
the maximum yield index. It thus provides full insurance against  y p~ ~
2 1b b . In addition, he
selects on financial markets a short (long) CYI futures position against the  y ~ yield risk with a
futures yield at planting equal to the expected aggregate yield and an optimal hedge ratio
equal to  1 2a b  if  1 a  is positive (negative), and a short (long) price futures positions with a
futures price at planting equal to the expected aggregate yield and an optimal hedge ratio
equal to  2 1a b  if  2 a  is positive (negative).
4 Therefore, revenue insurance, crop yield
insurance futures contracts and price futures contracts are complementary. The final wealth of
the insured producer is
                                                
4 The CYI hedging ratio is defined up to a multiplicative factor which depends on the unit of trading of the
financial contracts. For example, the unit of trading for Iowa Corn Yield Insurance Futures is the Iowa yield
estimate in bushels per acre times $100.20
(47) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1
1 ~ / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , e e b b a b a b a a y y y E p y p E y E p E y p J y p w i i
A
i i
ins = + + + + + = - = .
The insured producer bears two sources of risk caused by the uninsurable and unhedgeable
price and yield basis risks.
The insurance and hedging strategy is now examined in the presence of yield and price
basis risks. Under fair insurance and financial markets, Proposition 3 and equation (36) yield
that the approximate indemnity function net of its premium is
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The first RHS term in brackets can be replicated by purchasing the IP policy at a coverage
level  1 = i q , with a revenue guarantee  max max ˆ ˆ y p y p = . The second RHS term in brackets
depends only on the price index. In order to replicate as close as possible the increasing and
convex form with respect to  p , the optimal hedging strategy should require a long futures
position and long straddles positions against the price risk (Mahul 2000b).
5 Likewise, the third
RHS term can be partially replicated by buying yield futures and yield straddles. Therefore,
insurance policy based on aggregate gross revenue, yield futures and options contracts and
price futures and options contracts turn out to be complementary. It should be noticed that
options were not useful in order to replicate the closed-form solution (26) with no basis risk,
but they become a useful hedging instrument in the presence of basis risks because of the non-
linearity of the closed-form solution (38) with respect to yield and price.
When the revenue insurance program is based on individual yield and national price, the
insurance and hedging strategy is replicated with the IP or RA contract rather than the CRC
policy. However, this insurance product turns out to have the highest enrollment among the
U.S. farmers, accounting for about one-third of the total crop insurance sales in the areas
where they are offered (GAO). This observation is a priori in contradiction with the above
                                                
5 A long (short) straddle is the market position established by buying (selling) a put and a call with the same
strike price.21
theoretical results. This may be the consequence of existing constraints on yield guarantee and
coverage level in the actual IP and CRC programs. Since these insurance policies are sold at a
price which is less than the actuarial premium thanks to the premium subsidies, producers will
be induced to select the policy which provides us the largest coverage. By construction, the
CRC product generates a higher coverage than the IP and RA products. Therefore, we can
conjecture that, for an identical level of coverage, the IP or RA product should be preferred to
the CRC product. This seems to be confirmed by recent empirical results obtained by Heifner
and Coble.
These authors also show that revenue insurance based on individual yield does not
substitute completely for forward pricing. Our previous theoretical results, when basis risk is
ignored, seem to contradict their empirical findings. Once again, this may due to the existence
of an upper bound on yield guarantee. This seems to be confirmed by their simulations about
the effect of yield guarantee on the optimal hedge ratio (see Heifner and Coble, Figures 19 to
22). When a revenue insurance contract like the IP program is available, the hedge ratio tends
to zero as the yield guarantee is higher than 125% of the historic individual yield in most of
the counties.
6 The presence of price basis risk could also rationalize the use of hedging
instruments in addition to revenue insurance contract, even if there is no constraint on the
yield guarantee.
Under the IP and RA insurance programs, the coverage level is equal to one, i.e. the
producer insures all his crop, or zero, i.e. the producer does not purchase the insurance policy.
This constraint may induce him to prefer the RA or IP plan depending on whether  1 b  is close
to coefficient of adjustment or to one. He may refuse to purchase both of them if  1 b  is close
to zero or the GRIP plan if  2 1b b  is close to zero.22
Conclusions
This paper has examined the design of an optimal crop revenue insurance contract when the
producer faces joint yield and price risk. This is a first step in a long-term research project on
the rational insurance purchasing decisions against multiple risks in the context of incomplete
markets. The message of this paper is twofold. Firstly, if the indemnity schedule is contingent
on individual yield and individual price, the optimal insurance contract has been shown to
depend only on the individual gross revenue. It displays full insurance under a trigger
revenue. In this context of complete markets, crop yield insurance contracts and hedging
instruments turn out to be redundant. Secondly, we have demonstrated that this result fails
when the indemnity schedule is contingent on yield index and/or price index that are
imperfectly correlated with their associated individual parameter. In this context of
incomplete markets, the optimal revenue insurance contract does not depend only on the gross
revenue index. A first closed-form solution of the optimal insurance contract against yield and
price indexes has been derived when yield and price basis risks are ignored. It can be
replicated with unconstrained yield and revenue insurance policies and hedging instruments
sold at a fair price. The IP and RA programs are complementary with the MPCI program, and
hedging contract against price risk are redundant. The GRIP plan has been shown to be
complementary with the yield and price futures contracts. We have also studied how the
presence of yield and price basis risks affects the optimal crop revenue insurance contract.
The impact of the producer’s prudent behavior and of the variability of basis risks has been
highlighted. A closed-form solution has been derived. The convexity of its indemnity function
with respect to both yield and price has provided a rationale for the use of options.
                                                                                                                                                        
6 These figures also show that, under the CRC program, the optimal hedge ratio increases with the yield
guarantee.23
The design of these two closed-form solutions could provide useful information to policy
makers in order to design future revenue insurance programs. In addition, it questions the
efficiency provided by the Crop Revenue Coverage.
If constraints on the yield guarantee and on the coverage level exist or if insurance and
hedging contracts are sold at a price higher than the fair one, then the closed-form solution of
the optimal revenue insurance policy, where basis risk is ignored, cannot be replicated any
longer. In particular, the revenue insurance contract cannot provide a full coverage against the
revenue uncertainty and, therefore, separate contracts for yield and price risk will play a key
role, even if the indemnity schedule of the revenue insurance policy is contingent on
individual yield and price. The correlation between yield and price will play a central role in
the optimal insurance and hedging decisions. These restrictions on the insurance contracts and
hedging instruments create a new source of incompleteness that will be investigated in further
research.24
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal indemnity schedule, solution to the maximization problem (16) subject to
constraints (17) and (18) is derived by using Kuhn-Tucker conditions for  ( ) y p I ,  for all
( ) y p, . The first-order condition with respect to  ( ) y p I ,  is
(A1) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ~ , ~ , , ~ ~
2 2 2 1 1 1 = ¢ - + - + + + + + ¢ y p EI c y p P y p I y p u E m l e b a e b a    ( ) y p, "
where  m  and  ( ) x l  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated to constraint (18) and constraint
(17) respectively with:











For all couple ( ) y p,  such that  ( ) 0 , = y p I , equation (A1) can be rewritten as
(A3) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 ~ , ~ ~ ~ , 2 2 2 1 1 1 £ ¢ - - + + + + ¢ ” y p EI c P y p u E y p K m e b a e b a
and its partial derivatives are
(A4) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] { } P y p u y E p y p K - + + + + ¢ ¢ + + ” ¶ ¶ 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
~ ~ ~ , e b a e b a e b a b
(A5) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] { } P y p u p E y y p K - + + + + ¢ ¢ + + ” ¶ ¶ 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
~ ~ ~ , e b a e b a e b a b
From the concavity of  u,  ( ) .,. K  decreases (increases) with  p  if  1 b  is positive (negative); it
decreases (increases) with  y  if  2 b  is positive (negative). For all  y , let  ( ) y p ˆ  be such that
( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ = y y p K . Under realized price index  p  and realized yield index  y , indemnity
payments thus are made whenever  p  is lower (higher) than  ( ) y p ˆ  if  1 b  is positive (negative).
From the theorem of implicit functions, the trigger function  () . ˆ p  decreases (increases) with  y
if the product  2 1b b  is positive (negative).
For couple ( ) y p,  such that  ( ) 0 , > y p I , equation (A1) becomes
(A6) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 ~ , ~ , ~ ~
2 2 2 1 1 1 = ¢ - - + + + + + ¢ y p EI c P y p I y p u E m e b a e b a
Differentiating equation (A6) with respect to  p  and  y  and rearranging the terms lead to the
first derivatives of optimal coverage expressed in equations (19) and (20).
Proof of Proposition 3
Optimizing problem (16) with respect to the insurance premium  P yields the following first-
order condition:
(A7) ( ) [ ] m = - + ¢ P y p I y p u E i i
~ , ~ ~ ~ .
Combining the above equation with equation (A1) yields26
(A8) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ , , ~ , ~ / ~ , ~ ~ ~ = ¢ - + ¢ - + = - + ¢ y p EI c P y p I y p u E y p y p y p P y p I y p u E i i i i l
for all ( ) y p, . Taking the expectation of the above equality with respect to ( ) y p ~ , ~  gives
(A9) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ] P y p I y p u E y p EI c y p E i i - + ¢ - ¢ = ~ , ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ , ~ ~ , ~ l .
If insurance is sold at a fair price, i.e.  ( ) 1 = ¢ I c  for all  0 ‡ I , then  ( ) 0 ~ , ~ = y p El . Since  ( ) .,. l  is
a nonnegative by definition, this implies that  ( ) 0 , = y p l  for all  ( ) y p, . Therefore, indemnity
payments are made is all states of nature. This proves the first part of the proposition.
If insurance is costly,  ( ) 1 > ¢ I c  for some  0 ‡ I , the non-negativity constraint (17) must be
binding for some ( ) y p,  with a positive probability. Indemnity payments are thus made is the
less favorable states of nature. This leads to the second part of the proposition.